[E-rundbrief] Info 568 - Nuclear Power and Weapons - NPT-speech.
Matthias Reichl
info at begegnungszentrum.at
So Jun 24 15:39:25 CEST 2007
E-Rundbrief - Info 568 - Alice Slater (Nuclear
Age Peace Foundation, USA)/ Matthias Reichl:
Nuclear Power and Nuclear Weapons.
NGO-plenary-statement, 2.5.2007, at the
UNO-conference of the Preparatory-committee
(NPT-PrepCom) for the Review-conference on
Non-Prolifeartion of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in
Vienna (Austria Center, 30.4. - 11.5.2007). Siehe auch Infos 538 u. 557.
Bad Ischl, 24.6.2007
Begegnungszentrum für aktive Gewaltlosigkeit
www.begegnungszentrum.at
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Nuclear Power and Nuclear Weapons
Matthias Reichl
(Center for Encounters and Active Non-Violence and Antiatom International),
one of the NGO-delegates, plenary-statement, 2.5.2007
NGO-plenary-statement, 2.5.2007 at the
UNO-conference of the Preparatory-committee
(NPT-PrepCom) for the Review-conference on
Non-Prolifeartion of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in
Vienna (Austria Center, 30.4. - 11.5.2007)
(Written by Alice Slater/ Waging Peace, USA.
Slightly edited by Matthias Reichl)
Recent crises with Iran and the Democratic
Peoples Republic of (North) Korea illustrate the
dangerous links between nuclear weapons and
nuclear power and the risks of nuclear fuel-cycle
technology. These issues reflect fundamental
instabilities in the pillars that uphold the NPT (Non-Proliferation-Treaty).
Article IV cites an inalienable right to
"peaceful" nuclear technology should be
understood in the context of the NPT bargain, and
not as a claim that is a fundamental aspect of
sovereignty. The "right" to nuclear energy, may
be limited or extinguished over time by
subsequent developments and agreements. The NPT
Article V promise of access to the "benefits" of
"peaceful" nuclear explosions was superseeded by
the abandonment of the notion of such projects as
digging canals with nuclear explosive devices and
by the adoption of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT). Any right, must be exercised in
the conformity with international law, and is
subject to limits upon the health, environmental
and security rights of the global community.
The Article IV-based right has enabled states
to build infrastructure for producing nuclear
weapons in a matter of weeks or months under the
guise of peaceful civilian energy. The same
facilities producing low-enriched uranium fuel
for energy can produce high-enriched uranium
for weapons. All commercial nuclear power
reactors are now producing plutonium as a
by-product which can be reprocessed for use in nuclear weapons.
The nuclear industry and some governments are
actively promoting nuclear power as a solution to
global warming. Studies show that nuclear power
is not carbon emissions free. Every step of the
nuclear fuel cycle - mining, development,
production, transportation and disposal of waste
- relies on fossil fuel and produces greenhouse gas emissions.
Furthermore, studies conclude that nuclear power
is the slowest and costliest way to reduce CO2
missions, as financing nuclear power diverts
scarce resources from investments in renewable
energy and energy efficiency. The enormous costs
of nuclear power per unit of carbon emissions
reduced would actually worsen our ability to
abate climate change as we would be buying less
carbon-free energy per Dollar spent on nuclear
power compared to the emissions we would be save
by investing those dollars in solar, wind or
energy efficiency. Moreover, the spread of
nuclear power plants increases the risks of
diversion of nuclear material for weapons use,
theft by terrorists, or the spread of knowledge
which could be employed in a clandestine nuclear
bomb program. It also increaes the risk of
terrorist attacks on reactors and their spent
fuel stores. Using the enormous investments that
are planned for nuclear power, to clean, safe,
climate-friendly energy production and energy
efficiency would be a much wiser use of resources.
Another troubling threat to the NPT's disarmament
promise is the US-India nuclear energy deal
announced in March 2006. International rules and
institutions derived from the NPT have prevented
non-Member States from using commercial imports
of nuclear technology and fuel to aid their
nuclear weapons ambitions. This deal is dangerous
for the NPT because commercial uranium imports
for safeguarded reactors will free up more of
India's domestic uranium for its military
program, which will remain unsafeguarded and free
of the necessity of IAEA inspections. The
US-India deal is nothing short of a recipe by
which India can increase its nuclear arsenal by
hundreds of warheads over the next several years.
The former head of India's official National
Security Advisory Board has argued that: "Given
India's uranium ore crunch, it is to India's
advantage to categorize as many power reactors as
possible as civilian ones to be refueled by
imported uranium and conserve our native uranium
fuel for weapons grade plutonium production."
India already has about 500 kilograms of weapons
grade plutonium, sufficient for roughly 100
nuclear warheads - about 11.5 tons of reactor
grade plutonium produced in the spent fuel of its
power reactors. Under the terms of the deal, this
stock of plutonium, too, would be kept out of
safeguards and also its Prototype Fast Breeder
Reactor, scheduled to start in 2010. It will be
fueled with reactor-grade plutonium and will
produce weapons-grade plutonium resulting in a
four-fold increase in India's current weapons
plutonium production rate. By substituting
imports for domestic uranium and expanding
existing uranium recycling efforts, India also
might be able to produce up to 200 kg a year of
weapon grade plutonium in its unsafeguarded power reactors.
Pakistans response, whould be predictable, as is
Chinas. Nuclear policy analysts Zia Mian, M. V.
Ramana and Frank von Hippel have warned that a
dramatic acceleration in the nuclear arms race in
South Asia may be triggered by this deal. Such a
development would be both dangerous and costly,
and set back the efforts for peace and
development in South Asia. (1) The US-India
nuclear energy deal undermines the basic
principle on which the NPT was founded. If India,
which developed nuclear weapons while remaining
outside the NPT, is granted the same privileges
as treaty members - indeed, virtually the same
privileges as the nuclear weapons states - then
other countries may well ask what benefit they
derive from adhering to their NPT commitments.
To come into force, however, the US-India deal
requires assent by the Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG) of countries. Each of the 45 NSG members,
who are all parties to the NPT, must agree to
change its rules and allow nuclear sales to
India. We urge the NSG to reject the terms of
this deal and to prohibit its implementation as
inconsistent with United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1172, adopted on 6 June 1998, and
referenced in the 2000 NPT Final Document. The
Resolution, passed unanimously, asks India and
Pakistan "immediately to stop their nuclear
weapon development programs, to refrain from
weaponization or from the deployment of nuclear
weapons, to cease development of ballistic
missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons
and any further production of fissile material
for nuclear weapons." It also encourages all
states to prevent the export of equipment,
materials or technology that could in any way
assist programs in India or Pakistan for nuclear
weapons." Indeed, the best course for the NSG
would be to wait until NPT states parties have
taken a decision on the matter, which may not
occur until the 2010 Review Conference.
Rather than foster a potentially large expansion
of the South Asian nuclear arms race, the NSG and
all NPT signatories should reaffirm their
commitment to the 2000 Review Conference
statement and support the United Nations Security
Council Resolution. They should try to strengthen
the long-standing international effort to end all
production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium to make nuclear weapons.
The dispute over Irans nuclear program continues
to escalate. On March 24, 2007, the Security
Council unanimously adopted resolution 1747
following up on Irans failure to implement the
Councils demands in resolution 1737 to suspend
its uranium enrichment and heavy water programs,
dramatically increasing the possibility of an
armed confrontation. Despite the false sense of
urgency that has been ascribed to the Iran
crisis, US intelligence officials stated recently
that Iran would not likely be able to acquire a
nuclear weapon until the middle of the next
decade. Meanwhile, about a dozen states in the
Middle East recently expressed interest for the
first time in starting nuclear power programs,
and the IAEA has agreed to assist the Gulf
Cooperation Council in developing nuclear power.
The Bush administration has taken a consistently
aggressive line in dealing with this situation,
pushing for strong action, while simultaneously
refusing to negotiate directly with Iran. Now, it
seems as if US administration, is moving toward a military solution.
Although many doubts have been expressed about
the US willingness to use nuclear weapons in an
attac on Iran, US policy allows for the use of
nuclear weapons for exactly this kind of mission.
Any military intervention by the US and it's
allies in Iran would certainly prompt a military
response by Iran, spreading the human
consequences across international borders und
fueling instability across a wider Middle East.
The US and Israel have both stated that "all
options are on the table", and have not be
willing to forswear the "nuclear option" when
asked to clarify their intentions. While the NGOs
assembled here believe that no military option
should be on the table for addressing allegations
about Iran's nuclear ambitions, the idea of a
nuclear first strike against Iran is an
intolerable breach of both the letter and the
spirit of the NPT, and should be reputiated at this PrepCom.
The disputing parties should heed Mohamed
ElBaradei's calls for mutual and sequential
confidence-building measures that would allow for
a return to negotiations. There is an urgent need
for a new diplomatic initiative.
The Iran situation underscores the risks
associated with the unchecked spread of the
nuclear fuel-cycle. Only the global phase-out of
nuclear power will put this inherent and
intractable proliferation risk to rest. Since the
2005 Review, however, we have seen the
acceleration of plans for a top-down, centrally
controlled Global Nuclear Energy Partnership that
is nothing more than a nightmare scenario of
plutonium in constant transit, subject to
terrorist theft and negligent accidents on land
and on sea. Regardless of where nuclear fuel
production facilities are located they bring with
them the fear and possibility of weapons
proliferation and ultimately represent a
formidable roadblock on the path to elimination
of nuclear weapons. The continued existence of
nationally based nuclear fuel-cycle facilities
and the system of nuclear apartheid embodied in
the GNEP would be formidable barriers to the
verifiability of a nuclear-weapons-free world.
But, any scheme that seeks to mitigate the risk
posed by nuclear fuel-cycle technology, such as
the proposals for multilateral controls suggested
by Mohamed ElBaradei, could exacerbate these
problems by spreading knowledge and equipment
that could be used in clandestine programs or in a breakout scenario.
We must guard against the prevalent scientific
machismo where scientific and technological
elites are pushing the agenda for this lethal
technology. Interestingly, in US President
Eisenhowers noted farewell address in which he
warned about the dangers of the military-industry
complex, he also cautioned against the abuse of
science, warning that: In holding scientific
research and discovery in respect, as we should,
we must also be alert to the equal and opposite
danger that public policy could itself becomes
the captive of a scientific-technological elite. (2)
As we meet in Vienna to recognize the 50th
anniversary of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, we wish to draw attention to our
long-standing concern over the IAEAs dual
mission to prevent proliferation, while promoting
"peaceful" nuclear technology. We commend the
Agency for its useful role in guarding against
proliferation. Nevertheless, this schizophrenic
mission undermines those efforts leaving the IAEA
susceptible to undue influence by the nuclear
industry. Having recently commemorated the 20th
anniversary of the Chernobyl tragedy, we are
particularly disturbed that, to this day, the
numbers of deaths, cancers, and other illnesses
attributable to the worlds worst nuclear reactor
disaster have been understated in official
publications of the IAEA and the WHO.
Confronting the risk posed by the proliferation
of "peaceful" nuclear technology must be placed
on a par with the reduction and elimination of
nuclear weapons. As a permanent solution, we
support the establishment of an International
Sustainable Energy Agency, and a transfer of the
current subsidies for nuclear energy and fossil
fuel development - about $ 250 billion per year -
to fund a new agency with a crash program to
build a universal and non-discriminatory global
energy system based on clean, efficient, and
renewable energy sources. NPT PrepComs and
Reviews would be useful platforms for the exploration of such alternatives.
(1) Z. Mian, M.V. Ramana, F. von Hippel. Feeding
potential for South Asia's nuclear fire. Asahi Shimbun. March 29, 2007.
(2) Eisenhower, Dwight D. Farewell Address.
January 17, 1961. www.independent.org/issues/article.asp?id=1133
The Audio-file of this speech "Nuclear Power and
Nuclear Weapons":
www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom07/statements/2mayGroup1.pdf.
A documentation of the whole UN-conference, including NGO-statements - see:
www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom07/)
Texts by Alice Slater, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (USA): www.wagingpeace.org
Einen der täglichen NGO-Berichte - auch zur
UNO-Konferenz - findet ihr im E-Rundbrief Info
538, meinen Bericht "Kriegerische und
'friedliche' Atomtechnik" im Info 557. Auf der
Homepage von "Reaching Critical Will"
(www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom07/)
sind sämtliche Texte der Regierungsdelegationen
und auch unsere Beiträge dokumentiert. Der
Textentwurf "Nuclear Power and Nuclear Weapons"
steht in "Gruppe 1" auf Seite 11-15. Meine -
veränderte - Originalrede ist unter "Audio"
anzuhören - beides in:
www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom07/statements/2mayGroup1.pdf.
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Matthias Reichl, Pressesprecher/ press speaker,
Begegnungszentrum fuer aktive Gewaltlosigkeit
Center for Encounter and active Non-Violence
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fon: +43 6132 24590, Informationen/ informations,
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