[E-rundbrief] E-Rundbrief 2160 - Chernobyl a war zone

[Matthias Reichl]

E-Rundbrief Info 2160 - Dr. Jim Green / The Ecologist/ Friends of the 
Earth Australia <https://nuclear.foe.org.au/>:Chernobyl is now a war zone.

Bad Ischl, 24.2.2022

Begegnungszentrum für aktive Gewaltlosigkeit

www.begegnungszentrum.at

(Siehe auch Rundbrief 156, 157 und 1959).


================================================

Source : The Ecologist

https://theecologist.org/2022/feb/25/chernobyl-now-war-zone


  Chernobyl is now a war zone<https://theecologist.org/profile/dr-jim-green>


    _Dr Jim Green<https://theecologist.org/profile/dr-jim-green>_


    | 25th February 2022 |

The invasion of Ukraine by Russia poses several nuclear threats, 
including the possibility of deliberate or inadvertent military strikes 
or cyber-strikes on nuclear facilities.

There is also the obvious difficulty of safely operating nuclear 
reactors in a time of war, including the impossibility of carrying out 
safeguards inspections. Last but not least, there remains the 
possibility that the conflict will escalate into nuclear warfare.

We are about to learn what happens when nuclear-powered nations go to 
war, putting nuclear power plants at risk of deliberate or accidental 
military strikes and thus risking a Chernobyl scale catastrophe.

*Retaliation*

It seems highly unlikely that either nation - or any sub-national groups 
- would deliberately target nuclear reactors or spent fuel stores in the 
current conflict. But assuming there is a 'gentleman's agreement' not to 
target nuclear power plants, how long would that agreement hold in a war 
that dragged on for years?

Either nation might choose to shut down its reactors in order to 
minimise risks. That would be a manageable and wise decision for a 
country with limited reliance on nuclear power – but it would be 
impractical for countries with a heavy reliance.

In any case, the radioactive reactor cores – whether kept /in situ/ or 
removed from the reactors – would remain vulnerable, as would nuclear 
waste stores. Spent fuel cooling ponds and dry stores often contain more 
radioactivity 
<https://johnmenadue.com/the-ukraine-crisis-could-trigger-a-nuclear-catastrophe-nobody-wants/>than 
the reactors themselves, but without the multiple engineered layers of 
containment that reactors typically have.

And if there is an attack on a reactor or spent fuel store resulting in 
a Chernobyl or Fukushima scale catastrophe – whether deliberate or 
accidental, whether instigated by a nation-state or extra-state group – 
disaster response measures would likely be chaotic and woefully inadequate.

A strike on one warring nation's nuclear reactors or waste stores could 
result in like-for-like retaliation. Rinse and repeat until multiple 
Chernobyl or Fukushima scale catastrophes are unfolding simultaneously.

*Conflict*

Even if catastrophe was averted, the wisdom of operating nuclear power 
reactors would be reconsidered in the aftermath of war. The warring 
nations – and many others besides – would likely reduce their reliance 
on nuclear power or abandon it altogether.

*Nuclear power plants are pre-deployed radiological weapons. Put 
bluntly, humanity might have the wisdom to phase out the use of 
pre-deployed radiological weapons for electricity generation before 
nuclear-powered nations go to war and deliberately or inadvertently 
cause nuclear catastrophes.*

The Russian invasion, coupled with an extended conventional war 
throughout Ukraine, could generate multiple International Atomic Energy 
Agency 'Level 7' accidents in a matter of days.

Or we might have to learn the hard way that using pre-deployed 
radiological weapons to boil water wasn't such a great idea after all. 
All the more so given the manifold connections 
<https://nuclear.foe.org.au/power-weapons/>between the 'peaceful atom' 
and nuclear weapons programs.

The current conflict between Russia and Ukraine provides a test-case of 
the above war-gaming. The worst-case scenario of nuclear-powered nations 
at war would involve evenly matched adversaries fighting a long war. The 
current conflict isn't so much a war as an invasion of a weaker 
nation-state by a powerful adversary.

Most likely it will not drag on for years as some wars do. That said, 
simmering conflict stretching on for years is likely, so nuclear plants 
will remain at risk.

*Disaster*

Russia has several thousand nuclear weapons. Ukraine ceded ownership and 
control of nuclear weapons located in Ukraine to Russia in the aftermath 
of the Cold War  - although that hasn't stopped Putin invoking 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/23/us/politics/putin-ukraine-nuclear-weapons.html>the 
spectre of a non-existent Ukrainian nuclear weapons program in recent days.

Russia's 38 reactors 
<https://pris.iaea.org/PRIS/CountryStatistics/CountryDetails.aspx?current=RU>supply 
20.6 percent of the country's electricity. Ukraine's 15 power reactors 
<https://pris.iaea.org/PRIS/CountryStatistics/CountryDetails.aspx?current=UA> across 
at four sites generate 51.2 percent of the country's electricity.

The risk of an inadvertent attack on reactors or nuclear waste stores is 
somewhat higher than a deliberate attack. Russia has just taken control 
of the Chernobyl nuclear site. The reactors were all closed long ago, 
but high-level nuclear waste remains on site.

James Acton from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace notes 
<https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/02/24/most-immediate-nuclear-danger-in-ukraine-isn-t-chernobyl-pub-86521>that 
Ukraine has constructed a nuclear waste storage facility at Chernobyl 
for spent fuel from other nuclear plants, but the introduction 
<https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-z/ukraine.aspx>of 
spent fuel has probably not yet occurred. Nevertheless, spent fuel from 
the Chernobyl reactors is still located there.

It's conceivable that waste stored at Chernobyl could be hit if and when 
Ukraine attempts to take back control of the site. The next 
Chernobyl-scale nuclear disaster could happen in Chernobyl. The 
containment dome over the infamous Chernobyl #4 reactor protects a huge 
inventory of radioactive material. The next Chernobyl-scale nuclear 
disaster could involve the same reactor.

*Dystopian*

Incursions and fighting around the Chernobyl plant could also disperse 
existing contamination. Russian military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer 
recently noted 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2022/ukraine-russia-invasion-geography-weather/>in 
the /Washington Post/: "The delivery of air-to-surface munitions, 
artillery, mortar and multiple rocket-launcher fire in the 
Belarus-Ukraine border area could also disperse radioactive debris in 
the soil."

Craig Hooper, a senior contributor at /Forbes/ writes 
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/craighooper/2021/12/28/a-ukraine-invasion-will-go-nuclear-15-reactors-are-in-the-war-zone/>: 
"The world has little experience with reactors in a war zone. Since 
humanity first harnessed the atom, the world has only experienced two 
'major' accidents ‒ Chernobyl and Japan's Fukushima disaster.

"A Russian invasion, coupled with an extended conventional war 
throughout Ukraine, could generate multiple International Atomic Energy 
Agency 'Level 7' accidents in a matter of days. Such a contingency would 
induce a massive refugee exodus and could render much of Ukraine 
uninhabitable for decades.

"Turning the Ukraine into a dystopian landscape, pockmarked by 
radioactive exclusion zones, would be an extreme method to obtain the 
defensive zone Russian President Vladimir Putin seems to want. Managing 
a massive Western-focused migratory crisis and environmental cleanup 
would absorb Europe for years."

He adds: "Put bluntly, the integrity of Ukrainian nuclear reactors is a 
strategic matter, critical for both NATO and non-NATO countries alike.

*Toxic*

"It seems unlikely that Russia has mobilized trained reactor operators 
and prepared reactor crisis-management teams to take over any 
'liberated' power plants. The heroic measures that kept the Chernobyl 
nuclear accident and Japan's Fukushima nuclear disaster from becoming 
far more damaging events just will not happen in a war zone."

Bennett Ramberg, a former foreign affairs officer in the US State 
Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, and author of the 
1985 book /Nuclear Power Plants as Weapons for the Enemy/ 
<https://www.amazon.com/Nuclear-Power-Plants-Weapons-Enemy/dp/0520049691>, 
discussed the nuclear risks associated with the Russia‒Ukraine conflict 
in a February 14 piece 
<https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/ukraine-nuclear-reactor-risk-by-bennett-ramberg-2022-02>for 
/Project Syndicate/.

Ramberg writes 
<https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/ukraine-nuclear-reactor-risk-by-bennett-ramberg-2022-02>: "Power 
plants are common targets in modern conflict, because destroying them 
inhibits a country's ability to carry on fighting. But nuclear reactors 
are not like other energy sources. They contain enormous amounts of 
radioactive material, which can be released in any number of ways.

"Aerial bombing or artillery fire, for example, could break a reactor's 
containment building or sever vital coolant lines that keep its core 
stable. So, too, could a cyberattack that interrupts plant operations, 
as would a disruption of offsite power that nuclear plants rely on to 
keep functioning.

"Were a reactor core to melt, explosive gases or belching radioactive 
debris would exit the containment structure. Once in the atmosphere, the 
effluents would settle over thousands of miles, dumping light to very 
toxic radioactive elements on urban and rural landscapes"

*Detonate*

Ramberg discusses 
<https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/ukraine-nuclear-reactor-risk-by-bennett-ramberg-2022-02>the 
chaos that would ensue: "[R]eactor operators who might mitigate the 
fallout would be more prone to flee for fear of being shot or bombed. If 
a reactor is in the middle of a chaotic battlefield, there may not even 
be any first responders, and ill-informed populations hearing rumors 
would be on their own wandering ‒ and panicking ‒ in contaminated zones.

"After the guns went silent, Ukraine would be saddled with the 
long-lingering effects that follow from any nuclear accident. And, as 
Chernobyl demonstrated, it would not be alone. Radiation releases do not 
observe national borders, and Russia's proximity would make it a sink 
for radioactive aerosol deposits. …

"Ukrainian anxieties about its nuclear vulnerability bubbled up in 2014 
when Russia invaded and annexed Crimea. Concerned that further conflict 
could result in a reactor attack, it appealed 
<https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Implications-Ukraine-conflict-national-nuclear-security-policy.pdf>to 
the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Security Summit 
to help boost its defenses. Unfortunately, there is no defense that can 
withstand a Russian bombardment."

A deliberate attack on a nuclear plant would almost certainly be 
counter-productive, but that doesn't mean it won't happen. Ramberg draws 
this comparison 
<https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/ukraine-nuclear-reactor-risk-by-bennett-ramberg-2022-02>: "A 
case in point was the March 26, 2017, bombing 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/20/us/airstrike-us-isis-dam.html>of the 
Islamic State-held Tabqa Dam in Syria.

"Standing 18 stories high and holding back a 25-mile-long reservoir on 
the Euphrates River, the dam's destruction would have drowned tens of 
thousands of innocent people downstream. Yet, violating strict 
'no-strike' orders and bypassing safeguards, US airmen struck it anyway. 
Dumb luck saved the day again: the bunker-busting bomb failed to detonate."

*Triggers*

There were reports 
<https://www.rt.com/news/323060-ukraine-nuclear-plants-danger/>in 2015 
<https://www.rt.com/news/323012-crimea-blackout-lines-blown-up/>that a 
sabotage attack on power transmission towers forced emergency shutdowns 
of a number of reactors in Ukraine.  However the source of the reports 
was /rt.com/, a Russian government mouthpiece which lacks credibility.

More generally, Russia seems to have wanted to highlight security and 
safety threats at nuclear plants in Ukraine since the 2014 invasion, 
while Ukraine has seemed keen to downplay any incidents - and highlight 
future risks in the event of an escalation of Russia's attacks. Where 
the truth lies, nobody knows: it is lost in the fog of the low-level 
warfare that has played out since 2014.

Cyber-warfare is another risk which could jeopardise the safe operation 
of nuclear plants. Russia is one of the growing number of states 
actively engaged in cyber-warfare. James Action notes 
<https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/02/24/most-immediate-nuclear-danger-in-ukraine-isn-t-chernobyl-pub-86521>that 
a Russian cyber-attack disrupted power supply in Ukraine in 2015 
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-cybersecurity-sandworm-idUSKBN0UM00N20160108>.

Nuclear facilities have repeatedly been targets of cyber-attack, 
including the Stuxnet 
<https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/this-is-how-they-tell-me-the-world-ends-9781635576061/>computer 
virus targeted by Israel and the US to disrupt Iran's uranium enrichment 
centrifuges in 2009. Reports from the UK-based Chatham House 
<https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/field/field_document/20151005CyberSecurityNuclearBaylonBruntLivingstoneUpdate.pdf> and 
the US-based Nuclear Threat Initiative 
<https://media.nti.org/documents/NTI_CyberThreats__FINAL.pdf>have 
identified multiple computer security concerns specific to nuclear power 
plants.

Putin reportedly has greater ambitions than invading and controlling 
Ukraine, so who knows where the escalation will lead, what risks will 
emerge, how long it will drag on, and whether it triggers a response 
from NATO countries and the US/NATO alliance more generally.

*Posture*

The risk of nuclear warfare is very low, but it is not zero. Perhaps the 
greatest risk is that one or another nuclear-armed nation will 
mistakenly believe itself to be under nuclear attack and respond in kind.

Near-misses have happened before 
<https://www.wagingpeace.org/preventing-an-accidental-nuclear-winter/>. 
For example, in 1979, a US training tape showing a massive attack was 
accidentally played. In 1983, a Soviet satellite mistakenly signalled 
the launch of a US missile. In 1995, Russia almost launched its missiles 
because of a Norwegian rocket studying the northern lights.

It doesn't help that NATO and Russian military doctrines allow for the 
use of tactical nuclear weapons 
<https://ippnweupdate.files.wordpress.com/2022/02/ippnw-briefing-paper-war-in-eastern-europe.pdf>to 
fend off defeat in a major conventional war. It doesn't help that some 
missiles can carry either conventional weapons or nuclear weapons 
<https://johnmenadue.com/the-ukraine-crisis-could-trigger-a-nuclear-catastrophe-nobody-wants/>, 
increasing the risk of worst-case thinking and a precipitous 
over-reaction by the adversary.

And it doesn't help that Putin's recent statements 
<http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843#sel=49:24:Qv6,49:77:1j6>could 
be construed as a veiled threat to use nuclear weapons, or that less 
than a week ago a referendum in Belarus revoked the nuclear-weapon-free 
pledge in its constitution, or that Belarusian president Aleksander 
Lukashenko recently joined Putin to watch the Russian military carry out 
a nuclear weapons exercise 
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/20/russia-and-belarus-extend-military-drills-amid-ukraine-tensions>, 
or that Lukashenko has said Belarus would be open to hosting Russian 
nuclear weapons <https://www.politico.eu/article/putins-nuclear-option/>.

Beatrice Fihn, executive director of the International Campaign to 
Abolish Nuclear Weapons, points to other concerns 
<https://www.politico.eu/article/putins-nuclear-option/>. "Russia and 
Belarus are not alone in their aggressive and irresponsible posture 
either," she writes.

*Explosions*

"The United States continues to exploit a questionable reading of the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) that prevents 
states from 'possessing' nuclear weapons but allows them to host those 
weapons. Five European states currently host approximately 100 US 
nuclear weapons: Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy and Turkey …"

In a worst-case scenario, the direct impacts of nuclear warfare would be 
followed by catastrophic climatic impacts.

Earth and paleoclimate scientist Andrew Glikson noted in a recent 
article 
<https://johnmenadue.com/the-threat-of-nuclear-winter-hangs-over-our-warming-planet/>: "When 
Turco et al <https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.222.4630.1283>. 
(1983) and Carl Sagan 
<https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/when-carl-sagan-warned-world-about-nuclear-winter-180967198/>(1983) 
warned the world about the climatic effects of a nuclear war, they 
pointed out that the amount of carbon stored in a large city was 
sufficient to release enough aerosols, smoke, soot and dust to block 
sunlight over large regions, leading to a widespread failure of crops 
and extensive starvation.

"The current nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia could 
potentially inject 150 teragrams of soot from fires ignited by nuclear 
explosions into the upper troposphere and lower stratosphere, lasting 
for a period of 10 years or longer, followed by a period of intense 
radioactive radiation over large areas."

He added: "Such an extreme event would arrest global warming for 10 
years or longer, possibly in part analogous to the consequences of a 
less abrupt flow of polar ice melt into the oceans …"

*Flimsiest*

Richard Garwin poses these questions 
<https://fas.org/rlg/010409-nci.htm>: "What happens with a failed state 
with a nuclear power system? Can the reactors be maintained safely? Will 
the world - under the IAEA and UN Security Council - move to guard 
nuclear installations against theft of weapon-usable material or 
sabotage, in the midst of chaos? Not likely."

There are examples of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
safeguards being suspended in the event of war or domestic political 
turmoil, including in Iraq in 1991, some African states, Yugoslavia, and 
most recently in Ukraine itself.

In 2014, Ukraine's ambassador to the IAEA circulated a letter to the 
organisation's board of governors warning that an invasion could bring a 
"threat of radiation contamination on the territory of Ukraine and the 
territory of neighbouring states." Ukraine's parliament called 
<https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/bennett-ramberg-calls-attention-to-the-dangers-of-fighting-near-nuclear-power-stations?barrier=accesspaylog>for 
international monitors to help protect the plants.

No special measures were put in place to safeguards nuclear facilities 
in Ukraine. IAEA safeguards inspections have been compromised 
<https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/asno-annual-report-2020-21.pdf>in 
Crimea since Russia's 2014 invasion - indeed there may not have been any 
inspections whatsoever. IAEA safeguards inspections in eastern Ukraine 
have also been compromised as a result of Russia's 2014 invasion.

Thus the IAEA has been unable to conclude that all civil nuclear 
materials and facilities in Ukraine have remained in peaceful use. Not 
that such conclusions carry much weight: the IAEA routinely reaches 
comforting conclusions based on the flimsiest of evidence.

*Smuggled*

Ukraine noted 
<http://www.nss2016.org/document-center-docs/2016/3/31/national-progress-report-ukraine>in 
its report to the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit that state nuclear 
inspectors were unable to safely perform their duties in Crimea and 
certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in 2014.

Even before the Russian invasion, Ukraine's nuclear industry was corrupt 
<https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/mar/30/ukrainian-corruption-casts-nuclear-pall-over-all-e/>, 
regulation was inadequate 
<https://www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/832/ukraines-nuclear-power-program-going-bad-worse>, 
and nuclear security measures 
<https://www.ntiindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/2020_NTI-Index_Report_Final.pdf>left 
much room for improvement. For the time being, it is highly unlikely 
there will be any regulation whatsoever of the country's ageing reactors 
and other nuclear facilities.

Yet another problem is that the risk of nuclear smuggling could worsen. 
Former Soviet states have been at the heart of the global problem of 
nuclear smuggling since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

In May 2014, Ukrainian authorities announced 
<http://web.archive.org/web/20190120161026/https:/www.nti.org/gsn/article/ukrainian-authorities-seize-possible-dirty-bomb-material/>the 
seizure of radioactive material that had been smuggled into the country 
from a separatist region, and speculated that the intention may have 
been to use the material as a radiological weapon.

*Scrutiny*

Russia's invasion of Ukraine will adversely affect its nuclear export 
business. For example the planned Hanhikivi reactor in Finland is 
unlikely to proceed and the plan for two Russian reactors in Hungary 
might also be abandoned. Russian-led reactor construction projects in 
numerous other countries could be jeopardised.

Swedish utility Vattenfall announced 
<http://wna.informz.ca/z/cjUucD9taT0xMzI2ODYwJnA9MSZ1PTkwOTg5NjAyMSZsaT0yNTIzMjk5Mg/index.html>there 
would be no more deliveries of nuclear fuel from Russia until further 
notice and that no new orders will be placed for fuel from Russia. There 
will likely be many similar announcements from countries, companies and 
utilities currently involved in civil nuclear trade with Russia.

Australian uranium exports to Russia were suspended 
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-australia-nuclear-india-idUSKBN0GY0T620140903>in 
2014 as a result of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, its threat to invade 
Georgia, and the downing of flight MH176. "Australia has no intention of 
selling uranium to a country which is so obviously in breach of 
international law as Russia currently is," Australia's prime minister 
told parliament 
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-australia-nuclear-india-idUSKBN0GY0T620140903>.

There is no prospect of a resumption of Australian uranium sales and 
other suppliers might also black-list Russia. Domestic mines currently 
supply about half 
<https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-o-s/russia-nuclear-fuel-cycle.aspx>of 
Russia's annual requirement 
<https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/facts-and-figures/world-nuclear-power-reactors-and-uranium-requireme.aspx>of 
about 6,000 tonnes of uranium. Russia's involvement in overseas uranium 
projects might also come under scrutiny.

*This Author*

Dr Jim Green is the national nuclear campaigner with Friends of the 
Earth Australia <https://nuclear.foe.org.au/>.


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