[E-rundbrief] Info 458 - RLA 2006 - Daniel Ellsberg (USA)

[Matthias Reichl]

E-Rundbrief - Info 458 - Right Livelihood Foundation: 2006 
(Stockholm): Right Livelihood Award/ 'Alternative Nobel Prize' 2006 
for Daniel Ellsberg (USA) "...for putting peace and truth first, at 
considerable personal risk, and dedicating his life to inspiring 
others to follow his example."

Bad Ischl, 28.9.2006

Begegnungszentrum für aktive Gewaltlosigkeit

www.begegnungszentrum.at

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Right Livelihood Award 2006 ("Alternativer Nobelpreis")

www.rightlivelihood.org

Daniel Ellsberg

USA

"...for putting peace and truth first, at considerable personal risk, 
and dedicating his life to inspiring others to follow his example."

* Interview with Daniel Ellsberg

* Background on the Pentagon Papers (Wikipedia)

Daniel Ellsberg is a former Pentagon official, who followed his 
conscience and leaked secret information about the US government lies 
on the war in Vietnam - the so-called Pentagon papers. Ellsberg has 
ever since campaigned for peace and encouraged others to speak truth to power.

Career

Daniel Ellsberg was born in 1931, graduated from Harvard in economics 
in 1952, served in the US Marine Corps from 1954-57, and obtained a 
PhD in economics from Harvard while working for the Rand Corporation in 1962.

His academic specialisation was decision-making under uncertainty, 
and this was his focus as a strategic analyst at Rand, which he 
joined in 1959. Specifically his focus was on the command and control 
of nuclear weapons and the guidance to nuclear war plans. In 1959-60 
he became a consultant to the Commander-in-Chief Pacific and during 
1961-64 to the Departments of Defense and State at the White House, 
specialising in crises relating to nuclear decision-making. In 1964 
he joined the Defense Department to work principally on 
decision-making in the Vietnam War - his first day there coincided 
with the Tonkin Gulf incident which sparked the eight-year bombing of 
Vietnam. In the next five years, which included a spell of two years 
actually in Vietnam on the front line, he became progressively 
disillusioned with the war. This period culminated in 1969 in his 
decision that he had to do what he could to stop the Vietnam War.

Revealing the truth about Vietnam

Ellsberg had already passed top-secret papers to the press to 
influence presidential decision-making and that was what he decided 
to do again. He had just finished reading a 7,000 page top secret 
study of decision-making in Vietnam under four administrations, for 
which he had drafted one of the volumes. In October 1969 he started 
copying this and passing it to Senator Fulbright, Chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. When Fulbright did nothing, and 
after the invasion of Laos and Cambodia, he gave it to the New York 
Times, then the Washington Post and, when injunctions not to publish 
rained down on these papers, to seventeen other newspapers. The 
Pentagon Papers were out. They showed that the government had misled 
the US public about the war in Vietnam.

While the Supreme Court voided the injunctions as being contrary to 
the First Amendment, Ellsberg was arrested and indicted on twelve 
counts of felony. However, President Nixon was so concerned that 
Ellsberg might have even more sensitive papers that he would leak, 
that he illegally arranged the burglary of Ellsberg's former 
psychoanalyst, hoping to find information with which to blackmail 
Ellsberg into silence. This became part of the Watergate scandal, 
which led to Nixon's resignation and, ultimately, the end of the Vietnam War.

Working for peace

On the grounds of the governmental misconduct against him, Ellsberg's 
case was dismissed by the courts in 1973. Since this time, he has 
been working for peace and nuclear disarmament. In 1975-76 he was 
involved (as organiser, participant and fundraiser) in the 
Continental Walk for Peace and Social Justice. For several years he 
was on the National Strategy Task Force of the Freeze Campaign, and 
later served on the Board of SANE-Freeze. He has taken part in scores 
of actions and estimates that he has been arrested 70 times, most 
recently in protests against the Iraq War near the Bush ranch in 
Texas. He campaigned against the neutron bomb and later against the 
development of Cruise and Pershing, in Europe as well as the US. He 
sailed on a Greenpeace boat to protest against Soviet nuclear 
testing. He considers that it was the popular success of the Freeze 
campaign against Cruise that caused President Reagan to propose the 
'zero option' on intermediate-range missiles in Europe, which the 
Soviets unexpectedly accepted, terminating the development of Cruise 
and Pershing in Europe.

In 1992, with Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR), Ellsberg 
launched Manhattan Project II, "aiming to achieve a consensus among 
anti-nuclear, arms control and disarmament groups on a comprehensive 
program of concrete steps to end the nuclear arms race and 
proliferation and bring about radical reduction in nuclear arms and 
ultimate abolition". The consensus was achieved - but of this 
programme, only a test ban treaty has been achieved (as a result of 
decades of activism), and that is under grave threat with current US policy.

Calling to patriotic whistleblowing

One of Ellsberg's insights when he became disaffected with the 
Vietnam War was that "the President's ability to escalate, his entire 
strategy throughout the war, had depended on secrecy and lying and 
thus on his ability to deter unauthorized disclosures - truth telling 
- by officials."

The parallels with the Iraq War were obvious, and in 2004 Ellsberg 
founded the Truth-Telling Project to encourage the insiders to expose 
official lying. The Project started with an op-ed in The New York 
Times in the run up to the Iraq War and was launched in September 
2003 with a letter signed by eleven former officials. It was a 'Call 
to Patriotic Whistleblowing' and involved both Katharine Gun from the 
UK and Frank Grevil from Denmark, who had been indicted for 
whistleblowing in their own countries. The Project has given rise to 
the National Security Whistleblowers Coalition (NSWBC), started and 
directed by Sibel Edmonds, an FBI whistleblower who was one of the 
original signers of the Call. It now contains over 60 former 
officials from national security agencies. Since 2004, Ellsberg has 
given more than 60 speeches on this and on the parallels between 
Iraq, Vietnam and, most recently, the developing crisis in relation to Iran.

Literature:

Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers. Viking-Penguin, 
New York: 2002.

The Next War (pdf). Article in October 2006 issue of Harper's Magazine.

Contact Details:
Daniel Ellsberg
90 Norwood Avenue
Kensington
CA 94707
USA

http://truthtellingproject.org

http://ellsberg.net

On September 28, Daniel Ellsberg can be reached at +1-510-526-2605 
(primary) or cell +1-510-847-4613.

--------------------------------------------------------

Interview with Daniel Ellsberg

questions asked by Ole von Uexkull on September 26, 2006
(free to use, no copyright)

Q: There are probably many high-ranking officials in the world who 
are plagued by a bad conscience. Why do so few dare to speak out?

A: Actually, I think that few if any high officials suffer from a bad 
conscience from participating in policies that they themselves 
consider reckless or hopeless or even immoral or illegal, because 
they feel powerless to change them. They may think of resigning--in 
silence, "like a gentleman"--but they conclude, with reason, that 
would have no effect on policy or events. It simply doesn't occur to 
them that they might have a very big impact, perhaps averting or 
stopping a war and saving many lives, if they went public with a mass 
of secret documents--as I did with the Pentagon Papers. They shrink 
even from anonymous leaks or resigning and speaking out without 
documents because they foresee little effect but great personal 
career costs, including being accused of betraying their promises of 
secrecy and their loyalties to colleagues and leaders.

Q: What convinced you to publicise your knowledge? Was it a long 
process for you personally to decide to change sides?

A: It was long after I saw the Vietnam War as hopelessly stalemated 
that I moved from trying to change it from inside, which didn't 
threaten my career, to leaking secret documents in hopes of averting 
an imminent, disastrous escalation, in March, 1968. A year and a half 
later, under a new president, I knew from inside information that the 
same prospect loomed again. At the same time, I met young Americans 
who were going to prison, as draft resisters, doing all that they 
could to protest and perhaps shorten the war even though they knew 
their individual actions had little chance of impact. I felt a 
responsibility to do likewise, even though the chance of affecting 
current policy by releasing essentially historical documents seemed 
small and the personal risk of prison very great.

Q: Were you afraid about your personal security or that of your 
family? How did you deal with your fear?

A: My wife was afraid that the government might try to attack me in 
various ways, even physically, but I didn't think so, so I didn't 
have to deal with that fear. (It wouldn't have stopped me, given my 
experience--as a civilian using my former training as a Marine 
officer--with the risks of combat in Vietnam). It turned out that my 
wife had been right.

Q: What did you as an insider learn about military decision-making in 
the US government? And what implications do your experiences from the 
1960s have for the present discussion about the Iraq war and the 
nuclear threat posed by Iran?

A: As an insider I learned over a decade that when policy is decided 
by a small group of men acting in secret, they can often choose and 
carry out a course of action that almost any outsiders, if they were 
not kept in the dark, would regard as insane: with human and social 
costs wildly disproportionate to possible benefits, little or no 
prospect of success but major risk of catastrophe, sometimes criminal 
or immoral. Precisely that happened not only in Vietnam under both 
Johnson and Nixon, but again in the Iran-contra debacle under Reagan, 
the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq and the current occupation, and 
now in secret planning for an attack on Iran, possibly even nuclear. 
All of the earlier costly fiascos could have been averted by timely 
exposures to Congress and the public, by one or more of the many 
insiders who were aware these policies were crazy and dangerous, if 
they had thought of accepting the personal risks of revealing the 
truth. I'm urging insiders who are rightly appalled at the current 
risk of nuclear war with Iran to consider doing that now.

Q: Do you think the Right Livelihood Award can help your cause in the US?

A: I'm hopeful that my receiving the Award for my own past and 
current efforts to blow the whistle on war or on deeply undemocratic 
and dangerous government activity will encourage others to do 
likewise, not in hopes of personal reward but because this unusual 
public recognition makes them aware that doing so can be widely 
regarded as "right livelihood," as the right thing to do, despite 
official condemnation and personal costs to themselves and their own families.


Pentagon Papers

 From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

(Redirected from Pentagon papers)

The Pentagon Papers is the colloquial term for United States-Vietnam 
Relations, 1945-1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense, 
a 47 volume, 7,000-page, top-secret United States Department of 
Defense history of the United States' political and military 
involvement in the Vietnam War from 1945 to 1971, with a focus on the 
internal planning and policy decisions within the U.S. Government. 
The study was commissioned in 1967 by Robert McNamara, then Secretary 
of Defense. McNamara appointed Leslie H. Gelb, who was also director 
of policy planning at the Pentagon, as director of the project. Gelb 
hired 36 military officers, civilian policy experts, and historians 
to write the monographs that constituted the content of the project. 
The Papers included 4,000 pages of actual documents from the 
1945-1967 period, and 3,000 pages of analysis.

Most, but not all of the Pentagon Papers were given ("leaked") to The 
New York Times in early 1971 by a former State Department official 
Daniel Ellsberg, with his friend Anthony Russo assisting in copying 
them. The Times began publishing excerpts as a series of articles on 
June 13. [1]. Controversy and lawsuits followed. On June 29, U.S. 
Senator Mike Gravel of Alaska entered 4,100 pages of the Papers into 
the record of his subcommittee on Buildings and Grounds. These 
portions of the Papers were subsequently published by Beacon Press. 
[2] The full papers have never been published; they are locked in the 
classified vault of the LBJ Presidential Library.

The Papers revealed, among other things, that the government had 
deliberately expanded its role in the war by conducting air strikes 
over Laos, raids along the coast of North Vietnam, and offensive 
actions taken by U.S. Marines well before the American public was 
told that such actions were necessary. All of this had happened while 
president Lyndon Johnson had been promising not to expand the war. 
The document increased the credibility gap for the U.S. government, 
and was seen as hurting the efforts by the Nixon administration to 
fight the war.

According to Anthony Lewis's contribution in the coursepack from 
James Goodale's (former inhouse counsel to the Times) law school 
course on Old Media, New Media the NY Times received advice from 
inhouse counsel not to publish. Goodale counseled otherwise.
One of the "credibility gaps" that the Times wrote of was that a 
consensus to bomb North Vietnam had developed in the Johnson 
administration on September 7, 1964, before the U.S. presidential 
elections. [3] However, according to the same Papers, none of the 
actions recommended by the consensus on September 7 involved bombing 
North Vietnam. [1] On June 14, 1971 the Times declared that the 
Johnson administration began the last rounds of planning for a 
bombing campaign on November 3, the day Johnson was elected. But the 
Papers say that on November 3 "The President was not ready to approve 
a program of air strikes against North Vietnam, at least until the 
available alternatives could be carefully and thoroughly re-examined." [4]

Another controversial issue was the implication by the Times that 
Johnson had made up his mind to send U.S. combat troops to Vietnam by 
July 17, and this became the basis for an allegation that he only 
pretended to consult his advisers from July 21-27. This was due to 
the presence of a cable which stated that "Vance informs McNamara 
that President has approved 34 Battalion Plan and will try to push 
through reserve call-up." [2] When the cable was declassified in 
1988, it was revealed that it read "there was a continuing 
uncertainty as to his [Johnson's] final decision, which would have to 
await Secretary McNamara's recommendation and the views of 
Congressional leaders particularly the views of Senator Russel." [5]

When the Times began publishing its series, President Nixon became 
incensed. His words to National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger that 
day included "people have gotta be put to the torch for this sort of 
thing..." and "let's get the son-of-a-bitch in jail." [6] After 
failing to get the Times to voluntarily stop publishing, Attorney 
General John Mitchell and President Nixon requested and obtained a 
federal court injunction that the Times cease the publication of 
excerpts. The Times appealed the injunction that was issued, and the 
case began (quickly) working its way through the court system.

On June 18th, the Washington Post began publishing its own series of 
articles. Ben Bagdikian, a Post editor, had obtained portions of the 
Papers from Ellsberg. That day the Post received a call from the 
Assistant Attorney General, William Rehnquist, asking them to stop 
publishing the documents. When the Post refused, the Justice 
Department sought another injunction. The U.S. District court judge 
refused, and the government appealed.

On June 26 the Supreme Court of the United States agreed to take both 
cases, merging them into the case New York Times Co. v. U.S. ( 403 US 
713[7]). On June 30th, the Supreme Court held in a 6-3 decision that 
the injunctions were unconstitutional prior restraints and that the 
government had not met the heavy burden of proof required for prior 
restraint. The justices wrote nine separate opinions, disagreeing on 
significant substantive issues. While it was generally seen as a 
victory for those who claim the First Amendment enshrines an absolute 
right to free speech, many felt it was a lukewarm victory at best, 
offering little protection for future publishers when claims of 
national security are at stake.

Thomas Tedford and Dale Herbeck summed up the reaction of editors and 
publishers at the time:

     "As the press rooms of the Times and the Post began to hum to 
the lifting of the censorship order, the journalists of America 
pondered with grave concern the fact that for fifteen days the 'free 
press' of the nation had been prevented from publishing an important 
document and for their troubles had been given an inconclusive and 
uninspiring 'burden-of-proof' decision by a sharply divided Supreme 
Court. There was relief, but no great rejoicing, in the editorial 
offices of America's publishers and broadcasters." (Tedford and 
Herbeck, pp. 2256 [8])

Bibliography

     * _____ (1971). The Pentagon Papers. New York: Bantam Books. As 
published in The New York Times. ISBN 0-552-64917-1.
     * _____ (19711972). The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department 
History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam. Boston: Beacon 
Press. 5 vols. "Senator Gravel Edition"; includes documents not 
included in government version. ISBN 0-8070-0526-6 & ISBN 0-8070-0522-3.
     * Daniel Ellsberg (2002). Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the 
Pentagon Papers. New York: Viking. ISBN 0-670-03030-9
     * George C. Herring, ed. (1993). The Pentagon Papers: Abridged 
Edition. New York: McGraw-Hill. ISBN 0-07-028380-X.
     * George C. Herring, ed. (1983). Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam 
War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers. Austin, TX: 
University of Texas Press. ISBN 0-292-77573-3.
     * David Rudenstine. (1998). The day the presses stopped: A 
history of the pentagon papers case. University of california press. 
ISBN 0-520-21382-3.
     * Thomas Tedford and Dale Herbeck (2001). Freedom of Speech in 
the United States, fourth edition'. State College, Pennsylvania: 
Strata Publishing, Inc. ISBN 1-891136-04-6.
     * U.S. Congress, House Committee on Armed Services (1971). 
United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967: A Study Prepared by The 
Department of Defense. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 
Office. 12 vols.


......................

Notes

    1.  INTRODUCTION TO THE COURT OPINION ON THE NEW YORK TIMES CO. 
V. UNITED STATES CASE. Retrieved on December 5, 2005.
    2.  The Pentagon Papers, Senator Mike Gravel, Beacon Press. 
Retrieved on December 5, 2005.
    3.  Edward Jay Epstein, Between Fact and Fiction (New York: 
Vintage, 1975) p. 82
    4.  Epstein, p. 88
    5.  John Burke and Fred Greenstein, How Presidents Test Reality: 
Decisions on Vietnam, 1954 and 1965 (1989) p. 215 n. 30
    6.  The Pentagon Papers Case. Retrieved on December 5, 2005.
    7.  New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
Retrieved on December 5, 2005.
8.       Tedford & Herbeck, Freedom of Speech in the United States, 5 
ed.. Retrieved on December 5, 2005.

Full actualized text:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pentagon_papers

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     Begegnungszentrum fuer aktive Gewaltlosigkeit
     Center for Encounter and active Non-Violence
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